State v. Hamlin Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 40026 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-20-2013
State v. Hamlin Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40026
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hamlin Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40026" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4122.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4122
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) NO. 40026 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2010·4031 
v. ) 
) 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE BARRY WOOD 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6406 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF TH E CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ...................................................................... 7 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 8 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hamlin's Motions 
To Dismiss And Suppress ............................................................................... 8 
A. Introduction ................................................................................................ 8 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hamlin's Motions 
To Dismiss And Suppress .......................................................................... 8 
1. Standard Of Review ............................................................................. 8 
2. Equal Protection ................................................................................... 8 
3. Due Process ....................................................................................... 13 
4. Miranda ........ ...................................................................................... 16 
5. Competency ....................................................................................... 20 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 22 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 23 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 (1984) .................................................. 17, 18 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) .......................................................... 15 
Coghlan v. Beta Thera Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388 (1999) ......................... 10, 11 
Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) .............................................................. 21 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) ..................................................... 20 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ............................................................ 14 
Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970 (Mass. 
2012) ............................................................................................................... 11 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) .................................................... 14 
Howes v. Fields, _U.S. _, _,132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012) ........................ 17, 18 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) ............................................... 11, 14, 15 
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, _,130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) ......................... 17 
McGriffv. McGriff, 140 Idaho 642 (2004) ............................................................ 14 
Meisnerv. Potlach Corp., 131 Idaho 258 (1998) .......................................... 10, 11 
Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ........................................................... 14 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ............................................... 14 
Stansburyv. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) ..................................................... 18 
State v. Alger, 115 Idaho 42 (Ct. App.1988) ....................................................... 16 
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................. 8 
State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 2008) .................................................... 16 
State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709 (Ct. App. 1998) ...................................................... 16 
ii 
State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430 (Ct. App. 2011) .................................................... 17 
State v. James, 148 Idaho 574 (2010) .......................................................... 17, 18 
State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859 (Ct. App. 1995) ............................................... 16 
State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623 (1986) ..................................................... 16, 19 
Stone v. State, 132 Idaho 490 (Ct. App. 1999) ................................................... 21 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ......................................................................... 17 
Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121 (2000) .................. 11 
Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004) ........................................... 21 
Statutes 
I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e) ........................................................................................ 9, 12 
I.C. § 18-15058 .............................................................................................. 9,12 
I.C. § 18-210 ....................................................................................................... 20 
I.C. § 18-211 ....................................................................................................... 20 
Additional Authorities 
State's Exhibit 100 .............................................................................................. 19 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Denvil R. Hamlin appeals from his judgment of conviction for sexual exploitation 
of a vulnerable adult. He asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss because his prosecution for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult denied him 
equal protection under the law and due process. He further asserts that the district 
court erred by failing to suppress statements given in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
and by finding him competent to stand trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On July 13, 2010, the Mountain Home police responded to a report of possible 
sexual abuse and theft. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) The 
reporting party was a social worker who worked with William McCormick. (PSI, p.2.) 
The social worker assisted Mr. McCormick due to his mental disabilities, which included 
schizoaffective disorder and mild mental retardation. (PSI, p.2.) The social worker 
reported that Mr. McCormick had been sexually abused by Mr. Hamlin. (PSI, p.2.) 
Mr. Hamlin reads at a 3rd grade level and has an IQ of 62. (R., pp.180-81.) 
Mr. Hamlin admitted that on one occasion, he put his hand beneath 
Mr. McCormick's pants and touched his penis and that Mr. McCormick touched 
Mr. Hamlin's penis over his pants. (PSI, p.2.) On another occasion, at Mr. McCormick's 
residence, both Mr. Hamlin and Mr. McCormick pulled their penises out and Mr. Hamlin 
put Mr. McCormick's penis in his mouth. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Hamlin also acknowledged 
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having anal sex with Mr. McCormick. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Hamlin believed that 
Mr. McCormick wanted to participate in these acts. (PSI, p.2.) 
Mr. Hamlin was charged with three counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult. 
(R., p.9.) Defense counsel sought a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. s. 18-211. 
(R., pp.17, 19.) 8ased on the report, Mr. Hamlin was found not competent to proceed 
and on October 10, 2010, was committed to the Department of Health and Welfare for a 
period of time not to exceed 90 days. (R., p.28.) At a status conference two months 
later, the court determined that Mr. Hamlin was still not fit to proceed. (R., p.37.) The 
magistrate finally found Mr. Hamlin to be competent on April 7, 2011. (R., p.78.) 
Mr. Hamlin was bound over and the Information was filed on July 7, 2011. (R., p.1 09.) 
Mr. Hamlin then filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his prosecution denied 
him equal protection of the law pursuant to both the Idaho and United States 
Constitutions. (R., p.116.) An amended motion was then filed, asserting that Idaho 
Code § 18-15058(1 )(a) and/or (c) is unconstitutional because the term, "vulnerable 
adult," is vague. (R., p.12S.) He then expanded on his equal protection claim, asserting 
that the statute denied the equal protection of the law to vulnerable adults, "by grossly 
burdening the right of such people to engage in personal relationships of a sexual 
nature, either with persons of normal intelligence or with persons suffering 
developmental disabilities or mental retardation." (R., p.126.) 
Mr. Hamlin then filed a motion to suppress, asserting that, because he was 
"mentally retarded, or a developmentally disabled vulnerable adult," his statements to 
authorities were taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of 
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the Idaho Constitution. (R., p.130.) Mr. Hamlin also sought the assistance of mental 
health expert witnesses to assist him in these motions. (R., p.132.) 
Mr. Hamlin then sought another competency evaluation. (R., p.136.) He 
attached an affidavit in support of Dr. David Sanford in support of both this motion and 
the motion to dismiss. (R., p.138.) The district court granted the motion for a 
competency evaluation. (R., p.169.) 
Mr. Hamlin then filed a memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss, 
asserting that his prosecution denied him equal protection of the law and his due 
process rights. (R., p.173.) Mr. Hamlin did not address the previously-raised 
vagueness question. (R., p.173.) He then filed a memorandum in support of his motion 
to suppress. (R., p.179.) In this memorandum, Mr. Hamlin conceded that his 
incriminating statements were made knowingly and voluntarily, but asserted that they 
were not made intelligently. (R., p.180.) Specifically, Mr. Hamlin asserted that, due to 
the fact that he read at a 3rd grade level and had an IQ of 62, he would not have 
understood or appreciated the choices available to him regarding his waiver of his Fifth 
Amendment rights. (R., pp.180-81.) 
Mr. Hamlin then filed a second motion for dismissal of charges based on the 
August 24, 2011 competency evaluation. (R., p.184.) While this competency 
evaluation found Mr. Hamlin "marginally competent to proceed," Dr. Sombke also stated 
that Mr. Hamlin did not appear to have the capacity to testify in his own defense. 
(R., p.184.) 
A hearing was held on October 3, 2011, on Mr. Hamlin's motions. At the hearing, 
Kathy Hamlin testified that she was Mr. Hamlin's wife and had a learning disability of her 
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own, namely, "that I have trouble reading and figuring out things on my own. Just takes 
me a while to comprehend everything." (Tr., pA7, Ls.21-25.) She believed that her 
"mental abilities" were about the same as Mr. Hamlin's. (Tr., pA7, Ls.1-5.) To her 
knowledge, no court had ever determined that Mr. Hamlin could not make decisions on 
his own. (Tr., pA8, Ls.20-25.) 
Dr. Sombke then testified. (Tr., p.52, Ls.10-15.) He testified that, based upon 
his August 24, 2011 report, Mr. Hamlin "probably met criteria for competency to proceed 
... my only concern that I had for Mr. Hamlin's competency was his ability to testify in 
his own defense." (Tr., p.53, Ls.18-24.) He believed that Mr. Hamlin would have 
difficulty "testifying and not incriminating himself because he doesn't totally understand 
a lot of questions that are being asked of him." (Tr., p.54, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Hamlin had a 
difficult time explaining what "sexual abuse" meant. (Tr., p.58, LsA-16.) He had a hard 
time understanding that the charges were serious. (Tr., p.59, Ls.8-12.) He believed 
that Mr. Hamlin may have a hard time understanding a prosecutor's questions and 
would have a hard time elaborating on questions, even in his own words. (Tr., p.62, L.8 
- p.63, L.5.) 
Following questions by the parties, the district court asked Dr. Sombke his 
opinion relating to whether Mr. Hamlin could knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligent waive 
his Fifth Amendment rights; Dr. Sombke stated, "that's a difficult question, but I - I 
would - I do not think that Mr. Hamlin would really understand what he would be 
waiving." (Tr., p.71, Ls.16-18.) He elaborated: 
You know, if he waived his rights - and he's so agreeable, he could just 
say yes to just about everything. So he doesn't want to disagree with 
anybody, and if they said, do you understand this? Say yes. Do you waive 
you - are you okay with waiving your rights? You just say yes. And then I 
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don't think he would really understand what that meant and what he was 
really doing. 
(Tr., p.71, L.20 - p.72, L.3.) Dr. Sombke could not recall if he had reviewed the 
recording of the interview. (Tr., p.74, Ls.2-4.) 
Officer Ty Larsen was the next witness. (Tr., p.77, Ls.1-5.) He testified that he 
interviewed Mr. Hamlin in August of 2010. (Tr., p.78, Ls.16-17.) Officer Larsen 
arranged for the interview; he was unaware of how Mr. Hamlin arrived at the police 
station but believed that he was accompanied by his wife. (Tr., p.80, Ls.1-2.) Officer 
Larsen never communicated to Mr. Hamlin whether he was free to leave the police 
department. (Tr., p.80, Ls.14-20.) He provided Mr. Hamlin with a Miranda rights form, 
which Mr. Hamlin signed. (Tr., p.82, Ls.1-9.) During the interview, Officer Larsen never 
became concerned that Mr. Hamlin did not understand him or was not responsive to his 
questions. (Tr., p.82, Ls.17-25.) Officer Larsen also testified that, in March, 2010, he 
interviewed Mr. Hamlin on an unrelated matter and was not concerned that Mr. Hamlin 
was unable to understand him. (Tr., p.89, Ls.1-3.) On both occasions Officer Larsen 
asked Mr. Hamlin to come to the station and he complied; he was cooperative on both 
occasions. (Tr., p.93, Ls.1-5.) During the March interview, Mr. Hamlin denied any 
criminal culpability, but he made incriminating statements during the August interview. 
(Tr., p.93, Ls.1-14.) Officer Larsen did acknowledge that he knew Mr. Hamlin had 
difficulty reading, which is why he read the Miranda form to Mr. Hamlin. (Tr., p.95, LS.7-
25.) 
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The district court denied the motions at issue on appeal. 1 (R., p.233.) 
Mr. Hamlin then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal from the 
denial of his motions. (R., p.260.) The district court imposed consecutive unified 
sentences of ten years, with two years fixed, and suspended the sentences and placed 
Mr. Hamlin on probation. (R., p.267.) Mr. Hamlin appealed. (R., p.278.) He asserts 
that the district court erred by denying his pretrial motions. 
1 The district court granted a motion in limine and delayed ruling on other issues that are 
not relevant to the issues on appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hamlin's motions to dismiss and suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hamlin's Motions To Dismiss And 
Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hamlin asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
because his prosecution for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult denied him equal 
protection under the law and due process. He further asserts that the district court 
erred by failing to suppress statements given in violation of the Fifth Amendment and by 
finding him competent to stand trial. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hamlin's Motions To Dismiss And 
Suppress 
1. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a motion to suppress or dismiss is bifurcated. When a 
decision on such a motion is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of 
fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. See State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 
561 (Ct. App. 1996). 
2. Equal Protection 
Mr. Hamlin was charged with three counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult; 
the relevant statute provides: 
It is a felony for any person, with the intent of arousing, appealing to or 
gratifying the lust, passion or sexual desires of such person, a vulnerable 
adult or a third party, to: 
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(a) Commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any 
part or member thereof of a vulnerable adult including, but not limited 
to: genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, 
oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact or manual-genital contact, 
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; 
(b) Involve a vulnerable adult in any act of bestiality or sadomasochism as 
defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code; or 
(c) Cause or have sexual contact with a vulnerable adult, not amounting to 
lewd conduct as defined in paragraph (a) of this subsection. 
I.C. § 18-15058. "Vulnerable adult" is defined as, 
a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to protect 
himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental 
impairment which affects the person's judgment or behavior to the extent 
that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate 
or implement decisions regarding his person, funds, property or resources. 
I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e). 
With regard to this issue, Mr. Hamlin filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his 
prosecution denied him equal protection of the law pursuant to both the Idaho and 
United States Constitutions. (R., p.116.) An amended motion was then filed, asserting 
that Idaho Code § 18-15058(1)(a) and/or (c) is unconstitutional because the term, 
"vulnerable adult," is vague. (R., p.125.) He then expanded on his equal protection 
claim, asserting that the statute denied the equal protection of the law to vulnerable 
adults, "by grossly burdening the right of such people to engage in personal 
relationships of a sexual nature, either with persons of normal intelligence or with 
persons suffering developmental disabilities or mental retardation." (R., p.126.) 
At the hearing, counsel for Mr. Hamlin elaborated on the claim. First, counsel 
expressly withdrew the vagueness claim, asserting, "we do not, in fact, present a void 
for vagueness argument." (Tr., p.103, Ls.21-23.) However, counsel asserted that the 
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statute was "overbroad" by its use of the word, "any person." (Tr., p.104, Ls.5-7.) 
Counsel explained: 
The statute creates classification. The statute and the definitional portions 
of that particular chapter defines vulnerable adult. This class of person, 
because of the language of the statute, may not, without actual 
commission of a felony, a vulnerable adult may not engage another 
vulnerable adult or anybody else in sexual contact. Forbidden. It's a 
felony. If the other person initiates, no matter what their status is, sexual 
contact with a vulnerable adult, they're guilty of a felony. The vulnerable 
adult, assuming it's consensual and the State concedes the conduct here 
is consensual in its pleadings - this makes the vulnerable adult an 
accomplice to the act. ... The language of the statute makes sexual 
relations between vulnerable adults and persons of normal intelligence a 
felony without exception. That's - that classification is created by the 
Idaho Legislature. 
No other group that I know of in Idaho has been deprived of their right to 
engage in sexual contact and sexual conduct with another person. No 
other class of person is this a felony offense. 
(Tr., p.104, L.15 - p.106, L.2.) Thus, the issue presented to the court was that equal 
protection was implicated because the legislature had created a class of citizen who 
had been deprived of their right to engage in sexual conduct. 
When presented with an equal protection argument, this Court identifies the 
classification under attack, articulates the standard under which the classification will be 
tested, and then determines whether the standard has been satisfied. Coghlan v. Beta 
Thera Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 395 (1999). Different levels of scrutiny apply to 
equal protection challenges. When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, strict 
scrutiny applies to fundamental rights and suspect classes; intermediate scrutiny 
applies to classifications involving gender and illegitimacy; and rational basis scrutiny 
applies to all other challenges. Meisner v. Pot/ach Corp., 131 Idaho 258, 261-62 
(1998). For analyses made under the Idaho Constitution, slightly different levels of 
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scrutiny apply. Strict scrutiny, as under federal law, applies to fundamental rights and 
suspect classes. Id. at 261. Means-focus scrutiny, unlike the federal intermediate 
scrutiny, is employed "where the discriminatory character of a challenged statutory 
classification is apparent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of a lack 
of relationship between the classification and the declared purpose of the statute." 
Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 395 (quoting Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859, 871 
(1976». Rational basis scrutiny applies to all other challenges. See Coghlan, 133 Idaho 
at 395. 
Under the strict scrutiny standard of review, a law which infringes on a 
fundamental right will be upheld only where the State can demonstrate the law is 
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term 
Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 126 (2000). To pass strict scrutiny, a law "must be narrowly 
tailored to further a legitimate and compelling governmental interest and must be the 
least restrictive means available to vindicate that interest." Finch v. Commonwealth 
Health Ins. Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Mass. 2012). A classification will 
pass rational basis review if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose 
and "if there is any conceivable state of facts which will support it." Meisner, 131 Idaho 
at 262 (quoting Bint v. Creative Forest Prods., 108 Idaho 116,120 (1985». 
Mr. Hamlin acknowledges that, generally speaking, vulnerable adults are not a 
suspect class and, therefore, rational basis review would apply to such a classification. 
However, as the right denied vulnerable adults is the right to engage in consensual 
sexual activity, and because that activity has been deemed a fundamental right by the 
United States Supreme Court, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), strict 
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scrutiny should apply. In his memorandum, Mr. Hamlin acknowledged, "the State has a 
distinct interest in avoiding the exploitation of the weak and vulnerable, sexually or 
otherwise. However, the statute, by its terms, grossly burdens the class by abolishing 
their legal ability to have sexual relations with anyone." (R., p.175.) Mr. Hamlin 
contended, "the legal elimination of all sexual activity by vulnerable adults is 
unnecessary to the State's interest in their protection." (R., p.175.) Mr. Hamlin admitted 
that Mr. McCormick was a vulnerable adult and asserted that he had also been 
classified as a vulnerable adult. (R., p.173.) 
Thus, in this case, Mr. Hamlin asserted that the State was criminalizing 
consensual sexual behavior between vulnerable adults. A vulnerable adult is not 
defined as a person lacking the ability to consent to sexual activity. See I.C. § 18-
1505(4)(e). It is defined as a person "unable to protect himself from abuse, neglect or 
exploitation .... " Id. The law in this case is not narrowly tailored; First, as noted by 
Mr. Hamlin in the district court, it applies to "any person," not to a person who is not a 
vulnerable adult. I.C. § 18-15058. Further, the statute does not require any allegation 
of force or a lack of consent. And the charging document in this case alleges neither 
force nor lack of consent. (R., p.109.) 
In denying this claim, the district court held that a vulnerable adult was, "in a 
practical sense," someone who lacked the capacity to legally consent. (R., p.238.) 
However, as set forth above, the statute does not define a vulnerable adult as one who 
lacks the ability to consent to sexual activity. The court noted that Mr. Hamlin asserted 
that he was a vulnerable adult, and "hence, the argument goes that because Hamlin is 
claimed to be a vulnerable adult that he is being treated differently than a victim who is 
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a vulnerable adult and, therefore, there is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Constitution." (R., p.239.) The court then concluded that protecting a narrowly 
defined class from harm by others does not implicate a suspect class or violate a 
fundamental right. (R., p.239.) 
However, the court did not address what rational basis there would be to charge 
one vulnerable with a crime and not the other if indeed Mr. Hamlin and Mr. McCormick 
were two vulnerable adults. Mr. Hamlin submits that in such a situation there would be 
no rational basis to make such a distinction and therefore charging one vulnerable over 
the other would not pass even rational basis review. Further, as set forth above, 
because the statute has the effect of denying the right to engage in sexual activity to an 
entire class of individuals, strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review and the district 
court erred by applying the incorrect standard. 
3. Due Process 
In his memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss for a due process 
violation, Mr. Hamlin asserted, "the fact of the matter is that both parties in the present 
case engaged in consensual sexual conduct and both are mildly mentally retarded. 
They should stand on an equal footing before the law and it is constitutionally 
inappropriate to apply the statute to the facts of the present case." (R., p.177.) 
Mr. Hamlin asserts that, by criminalizing consensual sexual conduct, the statute is 
unconstitutional as it is applies to this case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the "landmark case of 
Lawrence v. Texas[, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),] legalized the practice of homosexuality and 
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in essence made it a protected practice under the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution." McGriff v. McGriff, 140 Idaho 642, 648 (2004) (citation omitted). 
In Lawrence, the Court invalidated a Texas statute "making it a crime for two 
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct." Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 562. The statute outlawed "deviate sexual intercourse" between members of the 
same sex, specifically oral and anal sex. Id. at 563. The Court resolved the issue by 
determining whether the defendants "were free as adults to engage in the private 
conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 564. The Court acknowledged that "[t]here are 
broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause" in 
previous cases. Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965». 
While Griswold is the most well-known example of the Court declaring a right to 
privacy encompassed in the Due Process Clause, the Lawrence Court recognized that, 
"[a]fter Griswold, it was established that the right to make certain decisions regarding 
sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship." Id. at 565. Thus, in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invalidated a law prohibiting the distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried persons. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454 (1972). The 
Eisenstadt Court stated: 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the 
marital relationship. . .. If the right to privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether or bear or beget a child. 
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Id. at 453. As the Lawrence Court observed, "the reasoning of Griswold could not be 
confined to the protection of rights of married adults." Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 566. 
While the Court did not confine the right to privacy of the Due Process Clause to 
married couples, for a time it did confine that right to heterosexual couples. Thus, in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court upheld a statute making it a crime 
to engage in sodomy. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. In Lawrence, the Court reconsidered 
the ruling in Bowers and expressed concern that the statutes in question "do seek to 
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the 
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals." 
Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 567. According to Lawrence: 
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and 
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt 
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can 
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The 
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In light of Lawrence, there is no distinction between sexual acts practiced 
between married couples and homosexual couples, for after Lawrence, "[t]he petitioners 
are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence 
or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to 
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct 
without intervention of the government." Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 578. 
Mr. Hamlin clearly asserted that the conduct in this case was consensual. 
(R., p.177.) The district court denied this claim based on State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261 
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(Ct. App. 2008), and its conclusion that the statutory scheme was designed to prohibit 
sexual contact with vulnerable adults as that term was defined, not sexual contact 
between consenting adults in general. (R., p.239.) In Cook, the defendant asserted 
that his prosecution for the infamous crime against nature was unconstitutional in light 
of Lawrence. Cook, 146 Idaho at 262. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant 
had failed to meet his burden because, "Cook has not shown that he was prosecuted for 
contact that occurred in private and with an adult who could and did consent." Id. at 
264. Here, however, Mr. Hamlin specifically asserted that the conduct was consensual 
and there is no dispute that it was private. Mr. Hamlin therefore asserts that the district 
court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on this basis. 
4. Miranda 
Any waiver of Miranda rights or the underlying constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Alger, 
115 Idaho 42, 45 (Ct.App.1988). The state bears the burden of demonstrating that an 
individual has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights by a 
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709,712 (Ct. App. 1998). An 
appellate review of this waiver issue encompasses the totality of the circumstances. 
State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 863 (Ct. App. 1995); Alger, 115 Idaho at 46. A 
notification of rights form is not conclusive evidence of waiver. See State v. Kirkwood, 
111 Idaho 623,625 (1986). 
In his memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, Mr. Hamlin conceded 
that his incriminating statements were made knowingly and voluntarily, but asserted that 
they were not made intelligently. (R., p.180.) Specifically, Mr. Hamlin asserted that, 
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due to the fact that he reads at a 3rd grade level and has an IQ of 62, he would not have 
understood or appreciated the choices available to him regarding his waiver of his Fifth 
Amendment rights. (R., pp.180-81.) 
The district court denied the motion on the basis that Mr. Hamlin was not in 
"custody" for purposes of Miranda and that Mr. Hamlin had been properly advised of his 
Miranda rights. (R., p.236.) Specifically, the district court noted that Mr. Hamlin 
voluntarily appeared at the police station; Detective Larsen read Mr. Hamlin his Miranda 
warnings and Mr. Hamlin stated he understood; Detective Larsen was in plain clothes; 
the interview was not hostile or threatening; Mr. Hamlin was not restrained or prevented 
from leaving; and Detective Larsen did not communicate his intent to arrest Mr. Hamlin 
until the very end of the interview. (R., p.236.) 
Mr. Hamlin first asserts that the district court erred by determining that he was 
not in custody. An objective test is used to determine whether a person was in custody 
when questioning occurred. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577 (2010). The relevant 
inquiry is how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the 
situation. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984); James, 148 Idaho at 577. 
The first step is to determine whether an individual's freedom of movement was 
curtailed. Howes v. Fields, _U.S. _, _, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). This 
inquiry, however, is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody. 
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, _, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010); State v. Hurst, 
151 Idaho 430, 436 (Ct. App. 2011). Thus, routine traffic stops and other investigative 
detentions pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), do not implicate Miranda even 
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though the detained persons are not free to leave during the stop. Berkemer, 468 U.S. 
at 440. 
This Court considers all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994); James, 148 Idaho at 577, 225 P.3d 
at 1172. This generally involves a consideration of whether the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation have created a "police-dominated atmosphere," and 
whether the circumstances involve the type of '''inherently compelling pressures' that 
are often present when a suspect is yanked from familiar surroundings in the outside 
world and subjected to interrogation in a police station." Howes, _ U.S. at _, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1191 (quoting Shatzer, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1219 ). Specific factors to 
be considered may include the degree of restraint on the person's freedom of 
movement including whether the person is placed in handcuffs, whether the subject is 
informed that the detention is more than temporary, the location and visibility of the 
interrogation, whether other persons were present, the number of questions asked, the 
duration of the interrogation or detention, the time of the interrogation, the number of 
officers present, the number of officers involved in the interrogation, the conduct of the 
officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 435-
42. The burden of showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence 
based on a failure to administer Miranda warnings. James, 148 Idaho at 577, 225 P.3d 
at 1172. 
Mr. Hamlin acknowledges that he drove to the interview, but it was Detective 
Larsen that arranged for the meeting. (Tr., p.80, Ls.1-2.) Thus, it was not as though 
Mr. Hamlin simply volunteered to show up at the police station. Further, Detective 
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Larsen never communicated to Mr. Hamlin whether he was free to leave the police 
department. (Tr., p.80, Ls.14-20.) He also provided Mr. Hamlin with a Miranda rights 
form, something he would not be required to do if the interrogation was not custodial. 
(Tr., p.82, Ls.1-9.) Thus, Mr. Hamlin asserts that, because the Detective arranged the 
meeting, did not tell him he was free to leave, and read him his Miranda warnings, that 
he was in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
Further, the district court held that, because Detective Larsen provided Miranda 
warnings, the statements were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. 
(R., p.236.) However, as set forth above, written Miranda warnings are not conclusive 
proof of waiver. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625 (1986). 
During the suppression hearing, the district court asked Dr. Sombke his opinion 
relating to whether Mr. Hamlin could knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligent waive his 
Fifth Amendment rights; Dr. Sombke stated, "that's a difficult question, but I - I would - I 
do not think that Mr. Hamlin would really understand what he would be waiving." 
(Tr., p.71, Ls.16-18.) He elaborated: 
You know, if he waived his rights - and he's so agreeable, he could just 
say yes to just about everything. So he doesn't want to disagree with 
anybody, and if they said, do you understand this? Say yes. Do you waive 
you - are you okay with waiving your rights? You just say yes. And then I 
don't think he would really understand what that meant and what he was 
really doing. 
(Tr., p.71, L.20 - p.72, L.3.) Mr. Hamlin acknowledges that, on the recording of the 
interview, Mr. Hamlin is cooperative and appears to understand the questions. (See 
State's Exhibit 100.) However, this should not be particularly surprising given 
Dr. Sombke's diagnosis - Mr. Hamlin comes across as "agreeable" and wanting to be 
cooperative. Considering Dr. Sombke's testimony that it was unlikely that Mr. Hamlin 
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would understand what he was waiving, coupled with Mr. Hamlin's mild mental 
retardation, Mr. Hamlin asserts that his statements were not intelligently made, and, 
therefore, the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress on this basis. 
5. Competency 
Idaho Code §§ 18-210 and 18-211 provide guidance on when a defendant may 
be tried and when a mental evaluation is required. Idaho Code § 18-210 provides that, 
U[n]o person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand 
the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, 
sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity 
endures." I.C. § 18-210. Further, the standard to be met before a mental evaluation of 
a defendant is required is set forth in Idaho Code § 18-211: 
Whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed as 
set forth in section 18-210, Idaho Code, the court shall appoint at least 
one (1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist or shall request the 
director of the department of health and welfare to designate at least one 
(1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report 
upon the mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense 
or understand the proceedings. 
I.C. § 18-211. 
The test to determine whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial is 
whether the defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him and whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding to assist in 
preparing his defense. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (holding petitioner 
had an intellectual understanding of the charges against him but his impaired sense of 
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reality substantially undermined his judgment and prevented him from cooperating 
rationally with his lawyer); Stone v. State, 132 Idaho 490, 492 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The district court must conduct a competency hearing whenever the evidence 
before the judge raises a bona fide doubt about the defendant's competence to stand 
trial. A bona fide doubt exists if there is substantial evidence of incompetence. 
Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 603-04 (9th Cir. 2004). Although no particular 
facts signal a defendant's incompetence, suggestive evidence includes the defendant's 
demeanor before the court, irrational behavior of the defendant, and available medical 
evaluations of the defendant's competence to stand trial. Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 
162,180 (1975). 
In this case, Dr. Sombke testified that, based upon his August 24, 2011 report, 
Mr. Hamlin "probably met criteria for competency to proceed ... my only concern that I 
had for Mr. Hamlin's competency was his ability to testify in his own defense." 
(Tr., p.53, Ls.18-24.) He believed that Mr. Hamlin would have difficulty "testifying and 
not incriminating himself because he doesn't totally understand a lot of questions that 
are being asked of him." (Tr., p.54, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Hamlin had a difficult time explaining 
what "sexual abuse" meant. (Tr., p.58, LsA-16.) He had a hard time understanding 
that the charges were serious. (Tr., p.59, Ls.8-12.) Dr. Sombke believed that 
Mr. Hamlin may have a hard time understand a prosecutor's questions and would have 
a hard time elaborating on questions, even in his own words. (Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63, 
L.5.) In his report, Dr. Sombke believed that Mr. Hamlin was incapable of testifying in 
his own defense. (R., p.192.) 
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The district court denied this motion on the basis that Mr. Hamlin had previously 
been found competent, and "whether the Defendant would be as sophisticated a 
witness as some may wish is not determinative." (R., p.240.) 
Mr. Hamlin acknowledges that he had previously been found competent to 
proceed and that Dr. Sombke found him "marginally competent," but Mr. Hamlin submits 
that, based on this record, the district court erred by determining that Mr. Hamlin was 
competent because a person who cannot competently testify cannot consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding to assist in preparing his 
defense. In a case like this, where there are only two witnesses to any alleged criminal 
conduct, the defendant and the alleged victim, the ability to testify in one's own defense 
is paramount. It is about the only way to rebut the charge. Mr. Hamlin therefore asserts 
that the district court erred by determining he was competent because he would not 
have been able to assist in his own defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hamlin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and that his case be remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 20th day of June, 2013. 
JUSTI IS 
DeputY'~tC!!~>ppeliate Public Defender 
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